To download a current copy of my CV, please click here: CV 2018.
Below is a condensed version.
Curriculum Vitae, February 2018
Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics
Ph.D. in Economics, Expected May 2020
M.A. in Economics, May 2017
Temple University, B.A. in Economics, minor in Mathematics, May 2015
Research and Teaching Fields
Primary: Political Economy
Secondary: Microeconomic Theory
Honors and Fellowships
Kirk Dornbush Summer Research Grant, Vanderbilt University, 2017
Rendigs Fels Award for Teaching Excellence, Vanderbilt University, 2017
Principles of Macroeconomics, Lecturer, Summer 2018
International Finance, Teaching Assistant, Teaching Assistant, Spring 2018
Macroeconomic Models for Policy Analysis, Teaching Assistant, Spring 2018
Graduate Micro Theory I, Teaching Assistant, Fall 2017
Graduate Micro Theory II ,Law and Econ Tutor, Spring 2017
Social Choice Theory, Teaching Assistant , Spring 2017
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory, Teaching Assistant, Fall 2016 and Spring 2017
Temple University MSRC ,Math and Economics Tutor , Fall 2014 thru Summer 2015
Private Tutoring in Mathematics and Economics, Fall 2013 to Present
Works In Progress
“The Stabilizing Effects of Disagreeing on Everything”
Candidates for office are restricted in what promises they can make by the party they are aligned with. My analysis shows that this type of candidate competition will have an equilibrium far more often than the classic model, and is robust to small changes in the electorate. Further, while candidate behavior is still strongly influenced by the locations of median voters, the candidate has some degree of autonomy, because there will generally be more than one possible winning position. Candidates are also shown to have choice over whether or not to take advantage of extremism of opinion.
“What happens when a Downsian wins? Incumbent control without rents.”
Most models of political control assume that the benefits politicians get are in the form of rents, or in getting to implement their desired policies. However, these models often shirk the issue of re-election by assuming a representative voter with a sociotropic decision rule votes on behalf of everyone. In this paper, I assume that challengers must search for a platform that will defeat the incumbent , and show that the probability of finding such a platform is strictly decreasing as the candidate produces more public goods, motivating good behavior in office.