Mathew A Knudson

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CV

To download a current copy of my CV, please click here: CV 2018.
Below is a condensed version.


Mathew Knudson
Curriculum Vitae, February 2018

Graduate Education

Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics
Ph.D. in Economics, Expected May 2020
M.A. in Economics, May 2017

Undergraduate Education

Temple University, B.A. in Economics, minor in Mathematics, May 2015

Research and Teaching Fields

Primary: Political Economy
Secondary: Microeconomic Theory

Honors and Fellowships

Kirk Dornbush Summer Research Grant, Vanderbilt University, 2017

Rendigs Fels Award for Teaching Excellence, Vanderbilt University, 2017

Teaching Experience

Principles of Macroeconomics, Lecturer, Summer 2018

International Finance, Teaching Assistant, Teaching Assistant, Spring 2018

Macroeconomic Models for Policy Analysis, Teaching Assistant, Spring 2018

Graduate Micro Theory I, Teaching Assistant, Fall 2017

Graduate Micro Theory II ,Law and Econ Tutor, Spring 2017

Social Choice Theory, Teaching Assistant , Spring 2017

Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory, Teaching Assistant, Fall 2016 and Spring 2017

Temple University MSRC ,Math and Economics Tutor , Fall 2014 thru Summer 2015

Private Tutoring in Mathematics and Economics, Fall 2013 to Present

Works In Progress

“The Stabilizing Effects of Disagreeing on Everything”

Candidates for office are restricted in what promises they can make by the party they are aligned with. My analysis shows that this type of candidate competition will have an equilibrium far more often than the classic model, and is robust to small changes in the electorate. Further, while candidate behavior is still strongly influenced by the locations of median voters, the candidate has some degree of autonomy, because there will generally be more than one possible winning position. Candidates are also shown to have choice over whether or not to take advantage of extremism of opinion.

“What happens when a Downsian wins? Incumbent control without rents.”

Most models of political control assume that the benefits politicians get are in the form of rents, or in getting to implement their desired policies. However, these models often shirk the issue of re-election by assuming a representative voter with a sociotropic decision rule votes on behalf of everyone. In this paper, I assume that challengers must search for a platform that will defeat the incumbent , and show that the probability of finding such a platform is strictly decreasing as the candidate produces more public goods, motivating good behavior in office.

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